Selective Accountability: Performance Indicators and Legislators’ Behavior, with Charles Louis-Sidois (Vienna University of Economics and Busines) & Elisa Mougin (ENS de Lyon)
We study how data-driven press coverage affects politicians’ behavior. Since 2009, the websites Nosdeputes.fr and Nossenateurs.fr publish performance indicators for French legislators. Compiling a comprehensive dataset of press articles, we track how these metrics are used by the press and estimate their effects on parliamentary activity. We find a positive impact on legislative performance, primarily driven by general press coverage, suggesting that monitoring tools must be visible to be effective. The effects are not driven by legislators who are explicitly mentioned, implying that indicators reinforce collective rather than individual accountability. Coverage of indicators also shape the nature of parliamentary work, though we find no evidence of strategic manipulation. Finally, using measures of media congruence and competition, we show that variation in media pressure is the main transmission channel. [CERGIC WP #003]